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Bachelors Thesis

A Bachelors Thesis written by Jonathan Björkman and Pontus Widne. The Thesis tackles contemporary issues with the European Union and internal organizational conflict.

Bachelor Thesis How International Organisations handle internal disagreements over conflicts Case study: the EU during the Ukraine Conflict Author: Jonathan Björkman & Pontus Widne Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson Examinator: Heiko Fritz Lärosäte: Linnaeus University Term: January 2026 Subject: Peace and Development Level: Bachelors Abstract International organisations rely on institutional decision-making capabilities in order to function, however these mechanisms often struggle due to differing national interests. This thesis examines the European Union's response to the Russo-Ukrainian war as a case study to understand how consensus and unity is achieved during security crises. By using a Neoliberal Institutionalist framework, the thesis' objective is to examine the mechanisms which allowed the EU to bridge the gap between political will and technical ability. This qualitative desk study utilises official legal documents from the Council as well as parliament voting records in order to analyse the shift from crisis response to long-term security strategy. The findings show that while issues regarding energy dependence on Russia and neutrality caused division, the Union successfully managed dissent through institutional flexibility. The thesis identifies mechanisms such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention, and the European Peace Facility as important tools for the EU to bypass deadlock. Moreover, the analysis shows that voting behaviour amongst members of the European Parliament was primarily driven by ideology rather than nationality. Conclusively, by using the EU and the Ukrainian conflict as the case study, this study shows how international institutions with diverse members can manage internal divisions. Keywords: European Union, Ukraine War, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Security Policy, Crisis Management Abstract.. List of Abbreviations... 1 Introduction and research problem.... 1.1. Objective and research questions. 1.2. Relevance. 1.3. Disposition. 2. Literature review. 2.1. The EU as a Security Actor. 2.2. Managing internal division. 2.3. Weaponised interdependence. 2.4. Research Gap... 3. Theoretical framework. 3.1. The premises of neoliberal institutionalism. 3.2. Using NLI for this study. 4. Methodology. 4.1. Case study method. 4.2. Data and data collection. 4.3. Research Quality. 4.4. Limitations & Delimitations. 4.5. Ethical Considerations. 5. Findings........ 5.1. Timeline of EU actions to the Ukraine Conflict. 5.2. Points of disagreement. 5.3. Different EU member positions. 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8 8 10 10 11 12 13 14 14 14 18 20 5.4. Russia and Central European illiberal actors. 24 5.5 USA and transatlantic cooperation. 27 5.6 Legal mechanisms. 28 5.7 Strategic costs. 29 6. Analysis.... 30 6.1. State centrism. 30 6.2. Sovereignty as a resource for international influence. 31 6.3. Predominance of political influence over military force. 32 6.4. State and nonstate actors organised around institutional principles and entities. 35 6.5. Mutual interest based on international cooperation.. 35 6.6. International institutions as mediators of international cooperation... 37 6.7. Peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international institutions. 38 6.8 Summary to Analysis. 39 7. Conclusion.... 39 References. 42 List of Abbreviations • AfD: Alternative for Germany • CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy • Coreper: Committee of Permanant Representatives • EU: European Union • EPF: European Peace Facility • EUMAM: European Union Military Assistance Mission • EFA: European Free Alliance • EPP: European Peoples Party • ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists • ESN: Europe of Sovereign Nations • FPÖ: Freedom Party Austria • GDP: Gross Domestic Product • INSTEX: Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges • ID: Identity and Democracy • MEP: Member of the European Parliament • NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation • NLI: Neoliberal Insitutionalism • OECD: Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development • PfE: Patriots for Europe • RCB: Russian Central Bank • SWIFT: Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication • S&D: Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats 1 Introduction and research problem International organisations rely on institutional decision-making capacities to function; these mechanisms, however, face problems when they contend with differing national interests. The challenges of keeping unity whilst also ensuring effective action are a common challenge in global governance. This is particularly evident within the European Union as it deals with the security crisis that is the Russo-Ukrainian war. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict started in February 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea following the Euromaidan protests, leading to years of protests and conflicts in the border regions. After eight years, Russia officially intervened in February 2022, sending Russian forces into Ukraine (Lehkodukh et al, 2023, pp. 753-768). This escalation from civil conflict to interstate war transformed the security landscape in Europe and reignited debates about the continent's security policy and its capacity to maintain peace independently. For decades, the European Union has relied on its partnership with the USA and NATO to ensure its defence. However, with increasing uncertainty regarding the USA's reliability, the question regarding the European capacity to defend itself has become an increasingly relevant political topic (Damen, 2022, pp.1-9). The Ukraine conflict has acted as both a catalyst and a test for the European Union's internal cohesion (Handl et al., 2023, pp. 1, 8-9). While this has mainly resulted in a united front against Russian imperialism, it has also revealed internal dissension due to differing national interests, such as economic and political ties to Russia. Understanding how the EU deals with internal divisions offers insight into the strength of international institutions. By identifying mechanisms allowing for cohesion despite conflicting national interests, the thesis contributes to a wider understanding of regional governance as well as decision-making during crises. 1 Despite much research already existing regarding EU foreign policy, a large theoretical gap exists in understanding those dynamics through a Neoliberal Institutionalist framework. Macro-level strategy is extensively documented; however, few studies analyse how micro-level coordination mechanisms like the Silent Procedure function to ensure cohesion when crises require unified action. 1.1. Objective and research questions The objective of this research is therefore to examine how organisations such as the European Union arrive at consensus in decision-making under particular challenges, using the case of the war in Ukraine. In order to achieve this objective, the study poses the following research questions: • How did the EU react to the Ukraine conflict over time, since February 2022? • Which issues caused disagreement? • Which different positions did member states take? • How did external actors influence the decision-making process? • How did the EU manage to create unity on policies? 1.2. Relevance Due to the lack of literature on the topic through the lens of Neoliberal institutionalism theory, we believe it is important to address the research problems within the topic in order to fully understand the EU's capabilities of acting like a unified security actor. As world tension increases each year due to severe changes in the international order and a challenge to established international law executed and posed by several of the world system's major actors, including the EU's main ally, the United States (Marchuk, 2020, pp. 65-96), the EU is placed in a unique security position. For the organization to function as a unified security force, capable of protecting its members independently of the United States and with adherence to international 2 law, it is vital to have information regarding how the organisational structure of the Union functions and how effective it is in its current state. 1.3. Disposition This thesis is structured into seven main chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 contains a review of the existing literature regarding the EU as a security actor, challenges of managing internal division, as well as the concept of weaponised interdependence. It further identifies the research gap concerning specific institutional mechanisms which ensures unity during security crises. Chapter 3 contains the theoretical framework of Neoliberal Institutionalism (NLI), defining the key premises of the theory. This will serve as the analytical lens for this study. Chapter 4 details the methodological approach. It explains the use of a mixed-method case study design, combining institutional analysis, discourse analysis, and roll-call analysis. Following that, it also discusses data collection, research quality as well as ethical considerations. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the thesis. It provides a summarised timeline of the EU's response to the war, the voting patterns on certain key resolutions, prominent disagreements among member states, and the influence of external actors such as Russia and the United States. Chapter 5 concludes by detailing some technical mechanisms, such as the Coreper and the Silent Procedure, which are utilised to facilitate decision-making. Aside from the last, all research questions are addressed here. Chapter 6 contains the analysis of the findings through the theoretical framework, and answers the final research question. It applies the premises of Neoliberal Institutionalism in order to explain how the EU managed to manage cohesion, interpreting specific actions such as the use of 3 the European Peace Facility and the mechanism of Constructive Abstention as rational institutional strategies. In this chapter, the final research question is answered. Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis, where it summarises the research findings, directly answers the research questions, and discusses the implications regarding the study of regional governance and security. This research beyond the specific European context, holds global relevance for the study of regional governance. As the world starts to shift towards a multipolar world, regional organisations such as the African Union, ASEAN, or Mercosur face similar challenges to the EU regarding the balancing of diverse national interests with the international need for collective security. The EU in this wider context, serves as an example of institutional resilience. By analysing specific institutional mechanisms such as Constructive Abstention and the Silent Procedure, this thesis offers insights into how international organisations can manage internal dissent. As world tension increases due to the major global actors going against established international law, understanding how non-hegemonic organisations can organise themselves to protect international norms is becoming vital. This study could provide a blueprint for how institutions can generate a form of hard power through the use of soft power mechanisms, meaning universal applicability to any region seeking strategic autonomy in an unstable global system. 2. Literature review The traditional discourse regarding the EU displays scepticism at its ability to assert any actual hard power. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, has greatly challenged this perspective, by demonstrating that the European Union is able to rapidly come to decisions regarding certain policies. However, in the academic world there is a gap in the literature that critically analyses this decision-making process. In order to understand the reasons for this clear shift, this chapter 4 analyses the already existing academic literature regarding three key areas relevant to the thesis. These are: The EU's evolving role as a security actor, the mechanisms utilised to manage internal division, and the theory of weaponised interdependence. 2.1. The EU as a Security Actor Traditionally, the academic discourse around the EU's role in global security has been dominated by scepticism regarding its ability to enforce any hard power, meaning the ability to coerce another organisation or country into specific action, primarily by using military strength. This older narrative, demonstrated for example by Manners (2002), argued that the EU functions as a normative power, that the EU's influence does not stem from military might, but rather their unique ability to shape a public perception of “normal” within international relations by promoting democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights. Manners further argues that the EU's unwillingness to militarise was not a weakness, but rather a unique characteristic of the union which made it different from traditional international powers. However, more recent academics have criticised such a view, seeing it as creating a strategic deficit. Biscop (2019) argued that the EU's reliance on soft power has rendered it too reliant on the USA for security guarantees. Biscop argued this in 2019, three years before the invasion of Ukraine yet after the invasion of Crimea. It shows how during this time, the EU was still viewed as militarily weak and reliant on the US, and provides excellent context for understanding the magnitude of the shift in the EU following the invasion, which forced the EU to abandon their passive role. This shift has been outlined in more recent research. For example, Genini (2025) explains that due to the weaknesses and challenges the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) faced during the initial stages of the Ukraine war, the EU was forced to adopt changes to it to better function in the new geopolitical landscape. 5 2.2. Managing internal division Within literature regarding EU foreign policy, the Unanimity Rule often takes centre stage. The Unanimity rule, which is the fact that in order for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to take a decision, consensus among every member is required. In theory, this rule ensures that each action taken has a high democratic legitimacy and in no way overrules the voices of lesser EU members. However, recent literature has highlighted how this rule creates a huge vulnerability during security crises, such as the Ukraine war Müller and Slominski (2025, pp. 1-27) describe the Unanimity Rule as an enabler of soft hostage taking. They argue that the veto power allows members to prevent collective defence decisions as a way to gain concessions unrelated to the decisions. This situation exposes the EU to “External Edging”, as discussed by Lovato & Simón (2025, pp. 813-818). The author argues that the Unanimity Rule is a significant factor in determining how effectively the European Union can resist external pressures, particularly in intergovernmental policy areas that are governed by unanimity voting, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the Common Security and Defence Policy, where individual states are able to leverage their veto power. This allows an external actor to influence a single member state for example, Russia or China. This creates a scenario in which external actors could minimise their costs or maximise benefits by blocking common EU policies from within, using the targeted member state (Lovato & Simón, 2025, pp. 813-818). 2.3. Weaponised interdependence The general constraint on direct military intervention has led most literature to suggest that the EU has primarily relied on its economic power as its main means of coercion. Farrell and Newman (2019, pp. 42-55, 67-75) put this into their framework of weaponised interdependence. They argue that in an international and globalised economy, important exchange nodes such as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and energy pipelines act as chokepoints. Countries controlling these hubs can leverage their control over them to pressure opponents. In the context of the Ukraine war, Rodrigues Vieria (2023, pp. 642-660) applies the framework to demonstrate how the conflict evolved into a struggle for the 6 central hubs. For example, the SWIFT financial network was forced to expel Iranian banks from its systems following the 9/11 attacks (Rodrigues Vieria, 2023, p. 645). Rising states seen as rivals to the European market, like Russia, have sought to become less dependent on that market for both exports and imports between 2011 and 2021 which is leading to a more fragmented world trade between two major spheres, the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian spheres (Rodrigues Vieria, 2023, pp. 646, 647, 660). This use of financial coercion has sparked debate and concern among EU members and officials. On one side, policymakers in the US and EU officials are adopting the language of weaponisation, such as French finance minister Bruno Le Maire, who characterised the Russian ban from SWIFT as a “financial nuclear weapon” (Rodrigues Vieria, 2023, pp. 645-646). On the other side, you have EU member states like Cyprus, Italy, and Hungary that expressed concerns about the potential abuse of financial tools. Despite this, the G7, which has certain key members like Germany and France, affirmed its commitment to ensuring that Russia is no longer able to weaponise interdependence of certain resources such as energy. The EU and its member states have been engaged in decision-making that would create a new financial institution that would shield themselves from abuse of weaponised interdependence from states like Russia or a potential non-democratic USA. An example of this was the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) (Rodrigues Vieria 2023, pp. 652-653.) 2.4. Research Gap Despite the EU's response to the Ukraine war being analysed in previous literature, a gap concerning both a political analysis of unity and the technical analysis of how unity was achieved remains. Literature by Genini (2025), Lovato and Simón (2025) identifies the macro-level changes and shifts in EU strategy. Similarly, Rodrigues Viera (2023) provides context on the economic logic of sanctions. However, a theoretical gap remains in applying Neoliberal Institutionalism to the micro-level mechanisms of crisis management, as traditional NLI literature often focuses on long-term treaty formation or macroeconomic integration. It often 7 does not examine how technical, daily procedural tools such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention or the European Peace Facility function as a stabilising institution during high-intensity situations. But these mechanisms are the tools that could alter the cost-benefit calculations that member states do, enabling cooperation where it otherwise might fail. Essentially by applying NLI to these specific tools, this study aims to address the gap between the political will for unity and the technical capacity to make it happen. 3. Theoretical framework This thesis derives its framework from neoliberal institutionalism theory. Neoliberal institutionalism is a variant of liberal theory that focuses on the role of international institutions in achieving collective results. Institutions are defined as stable and enduring sets of formal and informal rules that set behaviours, limit certain acts, and shape expectations (Forte dos Santos, 2021, pp. 650-655). 3.1. The premises of neoliberal institutionalism Neoliberal Institutionalism, or NLI, is defined by Keohane (2012) as a theory that analyses the impact that institutions have on states' behaviour in international politics as well as the incentives for international actors to comply with treaties and agreements, even without compliance mechanisms. Forte dos Santos (2021, pp. 653-654) synthesises Keohane's (2012, pp. 126-128) writings as seven premises. State centrism is the notion that states are the key actors in international politics. In the European context, cooperation and integration in international politics result from the decisions and actions of sovereign states that are crucial actors that participate in and are governed by an agreed international framework. This connects into the second premise, sovereignty as a resource for international influence. Essentially, state actors under neoliberal institutionalism do not view their sovereignty as a rigid barrier, but rather as a bargaining chip to be used in negotiations in order to obtain certain benefits, such as influence over policy-making. The EU is a clear example of this, where member states either pool or give 8 up some national sovereignty over specific policies in order to gain greater collective influence and strength on the wider international stage. The third premise is the predominance of political influence over military force. This focuses on the institutional agreements that facilitate cooperation rather than military power. The EU is highly reliant on legalisation, meaning power is exercised and constrained through precise, obligatory rules and third-party adjudication. Essentially, the EU favours diplomacy, law and political structures rather than military intimidation (Forte dos Santos, 2021, pp. 653-654) (Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-128) This also connects to the fourth premise, state and nonstate actors organise around institutional principles and entities. This core understanding of neoliberal institutionalism showcases how, if actors such as states within an organised international framework provide arrangements for third-party adjudication. It can result in progressive extension of rights and legal protection to the people of member states within that international framework. For example, the European Court of Human Rights or ECHR, after being established in 1998, has jurisdiction over 800 million people within 47 member countries, the International Criminal Court or ICC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or ICTFY, etc (Keohane, 2012, p. 132). Other examples of this could be the CFSP or the European Parliament. The fifth and sixth premises, mutual interest based on international cooperation as well as international institutions as mediators of international cooperation, are closely interconnected with the EU, as they are essential for sustained cooperation that benefits the most people across member states. Institutions on an international level have an important social purpose, which makes cooperation possible. International institutions provide a structured environment that facilitates collective results and can mediate the interactions between state and non-state actors. This leads to institutions being viewed as “foundations of social progress” and considered essential for continuous cooperation. International cooperation is built on mutual interests and exchange. A side effect of this is that once established, it will be difficult to radically change it or remove it. The final premise is peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international institutions. The social purpose of institutions based on a neoliberal institutionalism framework, is to promote human security, human welfare, and human liberty. This aligns with the EU's core missions, 9 which aim to end conflict and build prosperity and democratic values across the continent (Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-128) (Forte dos Santos, 2021, pp. 653-654) (European Union, 2025). 3.2. Using NLI for this study This thesis applies neoliberal institutionalism theory to the case of EU decision-making in the Ukraine conflict as a lens for understanding how organisations take the actions of several independent actors and align them towards common goals. It examines the mechanisms and processes which enable or disable united decision-making across each level of governance (Fortes dos Santos, pp. 650-655). In the context of this study, neoliberal institutionalism is useful because it highlights the internal relationship between the EU member states and how they negotiate, work, reconcile, and compromise in times of crisis, especially within EU institutions and programmes such as the European Council or the CFSP. It would also allow us to see the complexities and the different perspectives or motivations for each actor within the organisation. 4. Methodology This thesis is based on Bryman (2016, pp. 21-23, 309-313) definition of a qualitative desk study, with an abductive approach (Danermark, 2002, pp. 88-90). This means that the thesis utilises Neoliberal Institutionalism as the theoretical framework, breaking down the empirical research data that others have collected into premises, reinterpreting concepts and information within a new general conceptual framework. 4.1. Case study method This thesis uses a qualitative case study approach, with the EU's response to the Ukraine war as the case. The case study design is appropriate as it allows for in-depth examination of the interplay between interests, mechanisms, and external pressure (Bryman, 2016, pp. 60-64). 10 It also utilises a multi-method analytical approach in order to fully critically analyse the full scope of this case study. These approaches are institutional analysis, discourse analysis, and a roll-call analysis of member states within the European Union in relation to different resolutions and discussions. Institutional analysis is a type of text analysis which seeks to find what incentives are created by social rules, as well as actor's responses to the incentives. The analysis is traditionally used to understand the behaviour of decision-makers and their motivations (Hetfa, n.d.). In this study, institutional analysis is used to analyse the legal and procedural tools used by the EU to overcome deadlocks. It examines mechanisms such as Constructive Abstention and the Silent Procedure to understand how the institution makes decision-making possible. The second analysis used is discourse analysis, which is a way to analyse language in a social context, and can be applied to different forms of communications (Bryman, 2016. pp. 531-532). Discourse analysis is used in this study to analyse the narratives and strategies employed in the discourses of certain actors. This involves examining how actors such as the FPÖ and Fidesz frame their pro-Russia anti-EU stances and refusal to comply as “neutral” or “peace-seeking”. The final analysis used is roll-call analysis. Roll-Call analysis can be described as “the use of quantitative or qualitative research methods to understand the decision-making process behind a legislator's vote; the reasons and rationale behind that vote; and the implications and consequences of the vote" (Carvalho, 2011, p. 1485). This thesis critically analyses the voting behaviour of the member states in relation to certain key discussions and resolutions. This is not only an important aspect to analyse, but it allowed for additional analytical perspectives when analysing the European Union's capacity to create cohesion in a time of crisis, particularly with the case study of the Ukraine war. 4.2. Data and data collection This study uses several types of primary sources. To support the institutional analysis, the study utilises official legislative and policy documents from the European Union. Examples of 11 documents used are council decisions regarding the European Peace Facility (EPF), as well as official communications regarding sanctions. These sources were primarily accessed via the EUR-Lex database and the Council's public register. For the roll-call analysis, data were collected regarding EU resolutions relevant to the war in Ukraine. The data were obtained from the website HowTheyVote.eu and cross-referenced with the EU's official open access records. This allows the study to better distinguish between opposition due to national interest, such as Hungarian oil dependency, and opposition due to political ideology, such as far left or far right. In order to apply the discourse analysis, the study uses public speeches and party narratives. Included in this are explanations of a vote given by an MEP, as well as official discourses of actors such as Eurosceptic politicians. The primary data are supported by secondary data, such as peer reviewed academic articles, books, as well as articles and reports from think tanks. These sources establish the framework of Neoliberal Institutionalism, as well as provide context on issues such as economic impact and legal complexities. We mainly use a qualitative research method as is described by Bryman (2016, pp. 374-378), which is a research method aiming to generate deep insights concerning certain topics, and does so through engagement with places and social actors. This could include actors such as people, communities, organisations, or institutions. This allows us to interpret the sources, so they can be analysed and categorised in order to understand how disagreements between member states are demonstrated, discussed, and resolved. 4.3. Research Quality In order to ensure that the findings are trustworthy and factual, this thesis uses source triangulation, which in this case involves cross referencing different types of data (official voting records, public speeches) to combat the potential bias of a single source. While a unified press 12 statement might make it seem like a party is unified, cross references with official voting results can prove the opposite. The reliability and replicability of the data is ensured through the use of publicly accessible primary documents. This data regards the council decisions, legal texts, and resolution votes that are drawn from open-access official databases such as EUR-Lex, and the Council's public register. This will allow any other person to reproduce our data collection process. Finally, the reliability of the research is based on primary data, which are objectively based. This objective data mainly is comprised of official legal acts and public record of the European Union, the documents utilised, especially documents regarding Council decisions and European Peace facility regulations, represent the verified and finished outcomes of legislative procedures. Unlike subjective sources such as media reports or secondary accounts, these public documents provide an objective and legally binding record of EU decisions, which minimises the risk of relying on subjective interpretations. 4.4. Limitations & Delimitations This thesis has had to contend with certain limitations regarding data accessibility. Firstly, the access to certain academic literature was restricted by paywalls or institutional barriers. In order to mitigate this, the research is heavily reliant on publicly/physically available information. Secondly, institutional analysis is limited by the nature of the specific data sources. This thesis relies on primary data from the EU as well as documents to construct decision-making processes; they do not fully include the backroom deals and other informal parts of diplomacy. To address this, the analysis focuses on observable outcomes rather than speculating about secret agreements. Lastly, the Roll-Call analysis is constrained by absenteeism. Meaning that in certain votes, a significant proportion of MEPs could not vote or actively chose not to vote. An example of this is during the vote regarding reinforcing the EU's support to Ukraine (Howtheyvote.eu, 2024), 13 only 9 out of 21 Hungarian MEPs cast a vote. This created a scenario where a country's official voting record may not fully reflect the full political distribution of representatives (Howtheyvote.eu, 2024). To account for this, the analysis explicitly states the absentee rates when interpreting voting patterns. There are a few delimitations that this thesis is putting on itself. One of these delimitations is the use of only three resolutions from howtheyvote.eu. This is because of the amount of very specific EU resolutions that may not be particularly relevant to the scope of this thesis. One of these delimitations is the restriction of the scope to the war between 2022 and 2025, despite the conflict having a larger scope. 4.5. Ethical Considerations Due to all documents utilised in this study being publicly accessible, there are no ethical issues regarding privacy. 5. Findings 5.1. Timeline of EU actions to the Ukraine Conflict The European Union responded swiftly to the Russian invasion. Within days, the Union condemned aggression, approved a support package of 500 million euros to Ukraine, and banned transactions with the Russian Central Bank (RCB). On the military side, the EU formed the EUMAM Ukraine (European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine) to train and support the Ukrainian Armed Forces. One after the other, the EU adopted several sanctions, claiming that "since 24 February 2022, the EU has adopted 12 unprecedented and hard-hitting packages of sanctions in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine" (Press and information team of the Delegation to UKRAINE, 2024). Furthermore, on the 22nd of June 2023, every member of the EU granted Ukraine EU candidate status. The following section presents the timeline of the 14 EU's response to the Russo-Ukraine war by compressing the official EU timelines into four distinct phases (European Council, 2025). Phase 1: Economic and Energy Decoupling (2022) The response since February 2022 has been economic sanctions and energy decoupling from Russia, where the rapid implementation of nine economic sanction packages targeting key economic sectors such as aviation. Within days of the invasion, the EU condemned the aggression, froze economic assets of high ranking officials and key individuals and disconnected Russian banks from the SWIFT economic system. On February 28, the EU utilised the European Peace Facility (EPF) to fund lethal military aid due to the fact that Article 41 of The Treaty on European Union forbids the actual Union from paying for military equipment (Maletta and Héau, 2022). By March 2022, the EU closed its airspace to Russian air carriers and banned Russian state owned media outlets such as Sputnik and Russia Today to prevent the spread of propaganda. A notable change during March 2022 was the Versailles declaration, which aimed to decouple the EU from Russian energy (European Council, 2025). To begin to implement this idea, the European Commission launched the REpowerEU plan in May 2022. This initiative used the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), originally for the COVID-19 pandemic, as a financial instrument to find energy diversification (EIB, 2025). A significant strategic shift happened later in 2022 when the European council officially granted Ukraine its EU candidate member status on June 23rd, and four months later setup the EUMAM Ukraine which was officially launched in November. Later sanctions and resolutions proceeded to progressively ban imports of coal, solid fossil fuels, and eventually, in the 6th sanction package, banned seaborne crude oil and refined petroleum products. This caused an uproar from key EU member states such as Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia where the EU compromised with a temporary oil pipeline exemption. The EU after this incident implemented anti-circumvention clauses in this exemption that covered how member states that benefited from this were prohibited from reselling such crude oil or petroleum products to other member states or third countries (European Commission, 2022a). Additional counters to the 15 weaponisation of energy were needed, where the council adopted emergency regulations that capped gas prices and reduced the demand for it, consequently stabilising the single market against external shocks from actors like Russia (European Council, 2025). Phase 2: Military Support (2023) As the war continued into 2023, the EU's focus shifted towards increasing munitions production and combating sanction loopholes. The EU adopted the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) to gather 500 million euros for increasing artillery and missile manufacturing. Political agreements were made to provide Ukraine with 1 million rounds of ammunition, while the 10th, 11th, and 12th sanction packages combatted loopholes, targeted circumvention networks and banned Russian diamonds. Financial support continued with the EU agreeing on an 18 billion euro assistance package for Ukraine's government to continue to function (European Council 2025). Phase 3: Financial Architecture and Immobilisation of Russian assets (2024) 2024 was a year defined by the establishment of long-term financial architecture. It started with the EU launching the Ukraine facility, a 50 billion euro instrument (33 billion in loans, 17 billion in grants) in order to fund the future recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine through 2027. The Council of the European Union made a legal breakthrough where it agreed to use extraordinary revenues from immobilised assets from Russian banks to fund Ukraine's defense strategy, along with a G7-coordinated loan amounting up to 35 billion euros. Sanction packages 13 to 15 were targeted against the Russian “shadow fleet” which is a collection of vessels used to evade oil price caps and introduced a new sanction regime against “hybrid threats” which enables the EU to address threats such as the undermining of electoral processes, threats against and sabotage of economic activities, the use of coordinated disinformation, malicious cyber activities and other sorts of threats (European Council, 2025). Phase 4: "Peace Through Strength" and Total Decoupling from Russia (2025) 16 By 2025, the EU adopted a strategy that essentially can be described as peace through strength, emphasising that any ceasefire negotiation must be accompanied by strong and robust security guarantees from all actors involved. In response to diplomatic shifts, EU leaders acknowledged peace efforts made by President Trump but maintained the position that no decision could be made without Ukraine's involvement. Economic pressure was increased with the 16th through the 19th sanction packages, which introduced a full ban on Russian Liquefied Natural Gas or LNG imports and increased focus on the “Shadow fleet” with banning port access to these vessels. 2025 concluded with a massive commitment in December where the European Council agreed for a loan of 90 billion euros to Ukraine between 2026-2027, repayment of this loan was to be done through future windfall profits from immobilised Russian assets (European Council, 2025). The above timeline shows how the EU's reaction has changed throughout the years, going from crisis management to structural dominance. The EU transitioned from the early short-term emergency aid to long-term mechanisms such as the Ukraine Facility, and moved from specific energy sanctions to a complete ban on Russian fossil fuel. Out of all the responses that the EU did, the most common and prevalent one was economic and political sanctions against Russia and other involved actors, followed by military aid to Ukraine through EUMAM, the EPF and other means. Finally, different loop holes in the sanctions, particularly with the Russian shadow fleet, were tightened. Finally, the EU condemned and denounced Russian aggression internationally (European Council, 2025). A similar summary of the EU actions can be found with Paudel (2025, pp. 14-16, 24-30) who generalised the specifics from EU sanctions in order to categorise the sanctions by subject such as economic impact, trade, energy, etc (Paudel, 2025, pp. 14-16). However, despite the great and overarching scope of the sanction packages and other efforts, the final economic impact on Russia was mixed. While the EU's restrictive measures did in fact succeed in disrupting Russian trade, the overall efforts to cripple the Russian economy failed due to Russia adopting a strategy described by Paudel (2025, p. 30) as “Military Keynesianism”. They increased their military 17 spending by a significant amount, which led to economic growth and the creation of jobs. Russian shadow fleets further circumvent the oil sanctions by selling oil to other markets such as China and India (Kilinç-Ata et al., 2023, p. 385, Paudel, 2025, pp. 26-29). In fact, outside of economic factors, the sanctions from the EU had the opposite effect on the Russian population than intended. Instead of creating war-tired people willing to protest the government, their support for the regime increased, granting greater legitimacy to Putin in what is defined as a "rally around the flag” effect (Paudel, 2025, pp. 21-22, Herbert, 2022, p. 18). This data comes from the Levada Center, which is an officially independent Russian research center located in Moscow (Levada Center, n.d). The sanctions also pushed Russia into further embracing China, having them replace the EU as Russia's biggest trading partner. This provided Russia with a huge market for her fossil fuels, as well as a source of high tech items (Kilinç-Ata et al., 2023, p. 385, Paudel, 2025, pp. 26-29). This demonstrates how despite the EU's impressive solidarity in its initial response to the war, it has failed to stop the conflict. 5.2. Points of disagreement There have been a few issues the EU have not been fully unified on in regards to the Russo-Ukraine war. Sanctions on Russia have in fact been a debated topic within the EU, chiefly because many European countries relied, and still rely, on Russian resources, particularly gas. As reported by CREA Analytics (2025), the five largest consumers of Russian fossil fuels within the EU are, in order, Hungary, Slovakia, France, Belgium, and Spain. Together, these five countries import Russian fossil fuels worth 44,986 million Euro. In comparison, the EU combined spends 69,771 million Euros, meaning that five countries alone are responsible for approximately 40% of Russian fossil fuel imports. This is generally reflected in the way the listed countries vote. In the 2023 and 2024 reports on the Ukraine resolution, which among many things called for expansion of sanctions on energy such as gas and oil from Russia. For this resolution, 12 of Hungary's 13 voting MEPs voted against the resolution. In Slovakia, 8 out of 13 voting MEPs voted against it, which is almost matched by France's 38 out of 72 voting MEPs. The two 18 outliers are Belgium, where only 5 out of 15 voted no, and Spain where no MEP voted against the resolution. This fractures the EU when the Union votes to sanction Russia. This obstructionism was not only limited to EU votes on sanctions, but extended to other areas as well. An example occurred in 2022, where Hungary used its veto to prevent the adoption of the OECD Global Minimum Tax directive, as well as an 18 billion euro aid package to Ukraine. By blocking these proposals, Hungary's veto was used as leverage in order to negotiate concessions regarding the frozen Cohesion and Recovery funds (European Parliament, 2022). This strategy of obstructionism was a response from Hungary to the EU's deployment of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. This legal mechanism allowed the EU to sanction or suspend payments from the wider EU budget to certain member states that were in breach of the rule of law. This legal mechanism was used against Hungary, freezing billions in Hungary's Cohesion and Recovery fund, becoming a point of disagreement (Koranyi, 2025, pp. 1-28). The most divisive issue regarding the Ukraine war is continued military support for Ukraine. While a significant majority of the members of the European Parliament constantly votes for continued and increased military support for Ukraine, a significant and growing minority of members vote against seen from the political far left and right. This is clearly demonstrated by a 2024 EU resolution RC-B10-0191/2024 (HowTheyVote, 2024), which is a resolution covering topics such as North Korea's involvement in the war and calling on the Chinese government to end all military and/or dual use aid to Russia. The resolution's main points, however, focused on Ukraine and Russia themselves. The resolution mentions several condemnations and demands by the EU Parliament on the Russian state which are one, an immediate cease of military aggression against Ukraine, two, a condemnation of the cooperation between the North Korean and Russian military that supplies troops to fight in Ukraine as well as Russia's testing of new ballistic missiles within Ukraine, three, denouncing Russian military supporters such as Iran, Belarus, and North Korea that actively send direct military support to Russia. Particularly with North Korea's support, the EU 19 parliament says it further escalates the conflict. The EU considers the Russian war of aggression and North Korea's participation and nuclear/missile program a grave threat to the international order. In regards to Ukraine, the EU Parliament voted to accelerate EU solidarity, emphasising the need for increased and accelerated political, military, humanitarian, economic, and financial support for Ukraine until the war ends. Also reinforcing the military commitment from the EU and its member states are needed to meet Ukraine's security needs. The EU Parliament also reiterated its position that all member states and NATO allies should collectively and individually further commit to supporting Ukraine with no less than 0.25% of their respective GDPs annually to further assist the Ukrainian military. The resolution also reaffirmed the EU's commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine's peace formula as a new framework for international engagement. In this resolution, 52 members, 23% of voters, voted no with 9% abstaining. Of a total 719 members around the time of the vote, 142 did not vote, almost 20%. Here, similar voting patterns are seen. Unlike the previous vote, a large majority of Belgian MEPs voted in favour for the resolution. Around half of the French as well as a majority of Hungarians, however, voted against (HowTheyVote, 2024). 5.3. Different EU member positions While votes vary between resolutions, there are visible trends within countries and EU groups when it comes to their position towards the Ukraine war. Countries with high amounts of trade with or imports from Russia tend to vote in a more pro-Russia manner. This is shown most clearly within the voting patterns of Hungary, where the majority of MEPs tend to vote more pro-Russian. This is shown in resolutions such as RC-B10-0191/2024, A10-0154/2025, and RC-B10-0156/2025. With the exception of smaller nations such as Malta and Slovakia, no other EU member has a large majority of MEPs voting in a pro-Russian manner. France is constantly divided into two, however, in a recent resolution RC-B10-0156/2025, “Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia's war of aggression”, no French MEP voted no (HowTheyVote, 2025a). The French MEPs who traditionally voted ‘no' voted 'abstain' on this resolution, which is a surprising shift from previous votes. 20 When analysing different votes, it becomes clear that while a majority of a country's MEPs, with rare outliers such as the traditionally divided France, vote in a fairly unified manner, it is rarely the country which is the deciding factor, but instead the political group. Within the European Parliament, there are eight political groups, where MEPs from member states gather together to join their voting power. Simplified, the parties from furthest left to furthest right on the political scale are as follows: The Left in the European Parliament (The Left), a political group of democratic socialists, communists and far-left parties throughout Europe. The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), a political group composed of green and regionalist parties focusing on environmental concerns and social justice. Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), a center-left group advocating social democracy and welfare. Renew Europe (Renew) is a centrist group of liberal, social liberal, and liberal-centrist parties. European Peoples Party Group or EPP, is a center right/Christian democratic party focusing on Christian democracy, conservatism, and pro-European policies. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) is a right-wing group with national-conservative and Eurosceptic stances. Patriots for Europe (PfE) is a newer group on the political right with its origins in nationalist and sovereigntist movements. The newest and furthest right wing European parliament is Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) is the newest of the political parties being very Eurosceptic and focuses on national sovereignty (European Parliament, 2020) As seen in several votes, groups vote much more uniformly than countries do. While Groups close to the centre, such as the S&D and the EPP tend to vote in favour of pro EU and pro Ukraine resolutions, parties on the fringe, such as the Left and the ESN tend to be much more sceptical of such votes. France demonstrates this clearly. While French MEPs are scattered throughout the different groups, the largest concentration is within the PfE, where 29 members of their 81 total seats. In resolution RC-B10-0191/2024 (howtheyvote.eu, 2024a), of the present French PfE members, 100% voted against the resolution, which is not unusual for similar resolutions. This was not unique for the French PfE members, as 75% of the PfE members present voted against the resolution, with 25% abstaining. One of the MEPs voting no was the 21 . French Jean-Paul Garraud of the PfE, where he used a desire to seek peace in order to delegitimise military aid to Ukraine. This was achieved by presenting military spending as war escalation instead of defence “The Russian Ukraine conflict recalls the urgency of focusing on one objective; peace. We need to use all of our energy to achieve that. We have a president in the United States who's coming to the end of his mandate and he is pushing the west toward escalation by allowing long range missiles to be shot into Russian territory. And this is far from any peaceful solution and he is preparing his people for a terrifying prospect of the conflict turning nuclear (...) We only have one priority and that is peace. A negotiated and firm peace which respects the sovereignty of nations and we need to focus on the interest of people over everything else” (Garraud, 2024). By presenting peace and weapons as opposites, he attempted to gain a moral high ground, framing the refusal to support Ukraine as humanitarian (Garraud, 2024) . This view was in no way unique to the PfE, as several other members of the fringe group, such as Özlem Denirel, German member of the Left, argued very similarly. Like the PfE, the Left also voted majority no with only 13% of members voting yes. The arguably most extreme of the eight groups, the ESN, similarly voted no, with only a single member voting in favour of the resolution. ESN member Petar Volgin supporters of Bulgaria justified their overwhelming no by urging caution of a third world war, saying “(...) the EU leaders turn a blind eye to the biggest threat. The threat of a third world war. It seems a reality because the US and its European vassals allowed Kiev to use long ranged missiles against Russia. And no, this will not help Ukraine. If the policy of fueling the war goes on. The only outcome will be a Russian response that will make a strike with a supersonic oreshnik missile look like a festive fireworks.” (Volgin, 2024). Like Garraud, Volgin too is using peace rhetoric in order to delegitimise the Ukrainian cause, similarly seeking to gain a moral high ground by highlighting the destruction and death following an escalated war (howtheyvote.eu, 2024a). Horseshoe theory is a theory within political science that has frequently been criticised due to it being overly simple (Voets, 2022). However, an analysis of the French presidential election in 2022 suggests it has some merit in the context of the war in Ukraine. The theory states that far-right and far-left political groups tend to agree on similar issues but for different reasons. As observed by the Institute for a Greater Europe, the political centre and the extreme clash during 22 the election regarding the United States and NATO. The centrist candidates, such as Macron, consistently favoured European coordination and partnership with NATO and the US. On the other hand, Mélenchon of the far-left, and Le Pen of the far right both shared scepticism of such cooperation despite their ideological differences, after the invasion (Voets, 2022). This is mirrored by votes on anti-Russia resolutions in the EU parliament. The Left in the European Parliament often vote against additional military aid due to concerns about NATO expansion, imperialism, and similar issues, whereas the PfE and ESN vote against such legislation due to national sovereignty concerns and in opposition to European centralisation efforts. The roll-call analysis shows that political groups have a greater effect on a member's vote than nationality; however, this does not mean that nationality has no effect. In the same vote, the Left's 13% 'yes' voters were all from Nordic members. This pattern was repeated in the previously mentioned 2023 and 2024 reports on Ukraine, where the small minority of Left members who voted in favour of the resolution was once again exclusively Nordic. In neither of these votes has a Nordic member of the Left voted no. In both of the votes, every single Scandinavian, bar one single abstain, voted in favour of the resolutions despite their groups. Malta is another example of this. The six Maltese MEPs are equally divided between the S&D and EPP, both generally centre and pro-Europe. The six Maltese members, however, tend to go against their groups by either abstaining or voting no, often being the only members of their groups to do so (howtheyvote.eu, 2024b.) In the same two different resolutions, Hungary is an interesting outlier where the majority of votes come from PfE and ESN MEPs; however, in both cases, we see a few abstentions. In contrast, a substantial proportion of both ESN and PfE MEPs did not vote. This could be reasoned as a consequence of the Hungarian government's Eurosceptic leadership as seen in Reuters (2025). Despite nationality at times affecting a country's votes as proven by the aforementioned examples, they are outliers. For the majority of countries, individual groups affect votes much more than nationality. 23 While the thesis' roll-call analysis reveals that MEPs vote overwhelmingly by ideology rather than nationality, this does not necessarily contradict the Neoliberal Institutionalist premise of State Centrism. The Parliament acts as the main forum for political ideology and expression; however, the Council is the organisation with the ability to mobilise the EPF and enact sanctions, which itself operates on a state centric basis (European Council, 2017). The mechanisms this thesis has identified as necessary for maintaining unity, like Constructive Abstention and the Silent Procedure, are tools to manage the interest of countries instead of parties. A perfect example of this is the EU concessions regarding the Druzhba oil pipelines which were given to specific countries based on the reality of their infrastructure and strategic location, not their political affiliations. While internal factors such as neutrality and energy dependence explain particular voting behaviour, these factors are widened by external international pressures. This opens up the discussion regarding the role and actions of non-EU actors, specifically Russia's and America's influence targeting either specific political parties, the U.S. political shifts that alter strategic focuses of the crisis from helping safeguard Ukraine to seeing a peace treaty, no matter the loss. 5.4. Russia and Central European illiberal actors While ideological differences naturally provide internal divisions within any union, investigations have shown that the split in the EU regarding the Ukraine war is not solely internal, but also comes from external sources in a type of hybrid warfare. The main culprit of externally imposed division in the EU is Russia, chiefly due to the EU being the main supporter of Ukraine, but also because it is in the Federation's best interest to keep Europe divided and unable to stand united against it. Franziska Wagner, Liliia Sablina & Bálint Mikola (2024, pp. 159-190) explore the mutual relationship and legitimation strategies between the Russian state and illiberal Central European actors such as Austria with the FPÖ or known as the Freedom Party of Austria and Hungary with 24 Fidesz. Over the past 15 years, the Russian state has cultivated ties with extremist and Eurosceptic European political groups by utilising mutual legitimation strategies and sharing similar narratives to strengthen their positions domestically and internationally (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 159).The main strategy that Wagner et al. (2024, pp. 161-162, 173) use is the use of legitimacy as a discursive feature, where political actors use language and narratives to justify their actions. When this is used in a mutual sense, it would allow Russia to counter international pressure and in the case of the European political groups, enable them to present a united front against so-called “liberal democratic norms”. The FPÖ's pro-Russian stance had developed primarily as an alternative to the EU and the West, fueled by Austria's historical predisposition toward neutrality and its dependence on Russian energy. The domestic politics of the FPÖ focused on criticising the government's economic management and sanctions against Russia. The FPÖ, given Austria's energy dependence on Russia, is a strong supporter of Russian energy. Blaming the EU and Austrian government for the energy crisis and increased cost due to the aforementioned sanctions against Russia, arguing that they are pointless and can cause more harm than success. However, the main political stance remains neutrality as the FPÖ sees that it fits Austria (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 162, 163, 167-168). Additional legitimation strategies and narratives that the FPÖ utilises is the framing of rationalisation, by positioning its arguments and perspectives as logical and reasonable, aligning them with economic experts and neutral states, it would give more credence to the party as a political alternative. Other examples of narratives being dependency, national interest, rationality, and responsibility. Responsibility is frequently used by the FPÖ in order to align with populist discourse by blaming the government's actions, such as compromising Austria's neutrality (Wagner et al, 2024, p. 168). Fidesz's perspective shifted from economic pragmatism to openly and defiantly threatening to veto EU sanctions against Russia while aligning its rhetoric with pro-Russian propaganda, primarily when it reflects the Russian propaganda of the importance of peace. The party shares ideological perspectives with Putin's regime, mainly anti-Western, Euroscepticism, and 25 anti-LGBTIQ+. This sympathy with Russia is made clear in Viktor Orbán's 2022 speech at the 31st Tusványos camp 2022, where he referred to the conflict as a clash of values, saying “……… we do not want to tell them how they should live; we are just asking them to accept that in our country a father is a man and a mother is a woman (...)” and “In this corner of the world there will never be a majority in favour of this Western lunacy.” (Orbán, 2022). This mirrors the words used by Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly 2023, where he states “Look what they are doing to their own people. It is all about the destruction of the family, of cultural and national identity, perversion and abuse of children, including paedophilia, all of which are declared normal in their life.” and “We will protect our children from degradation and degeneration". Both leaders use a victimhood narrative, presenting their countries as defenders of traditional values against a more degenerated and decadent western world. Fidesz uses the narratives of moral evaluation and rationalisation in the sense of condemning the irresponsible Western reactions to Russia and appealing to the necessity of a peaceful resolution in the conflict to safeguard economic interests. Other key narratives and strategies include framing Hungary as a helpless observer in relation to international developments being subject to global superpowers like the US, NATO or the EU, shifting the blame of the war to the US or Ukraine, attributing economic hardship to the Hungarian opposition who support the sanctions against Russia, presentation of a logical Russian military, and utilising statements from Russian leaders or pro-government analysts without counter-views which lend external authority to pro-Russian perspectives (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 170-172). Russian state media, particularly Izvestia, use their platforms to legitimise Russia's foreign policy for its national audience. The consistent pattern involves two main categories: a rational discussion focusing on economic relationships and the negative effects of sanctions on Europe. This is accentuated by the involvement of European partners such as the Austrian FPÖ and the Hungarian Fidesz. The Russian media portrays Austria as a rational actor due to its non-support of sanctions against Russia, but also mainly within the topics of sanctions, the aftermath of the war, the consequences of sanctions, and sanctions on Russian gas/energy. Russian media also 26 portray Hungary as a rational actor aligned with Russia, committed to economic relations, primarily gas imports, and a particularly prominent issue is Hungary's opposition to sanctions. (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 165-176). Additional Russian media narratives and the legitimation strategies frame European actors as non-sovereign satellites of the US/NATO while legitimising actors like the FPÖ and Fidesz as the demonstration of real politics with concern for their citizens, criticising EU politics as destructive, and utilises experts from countries that align or are willing to align with Russian propaganda to justify the state's international actions (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 170-176). One of the most significant external sources of division is the scandal regarding the “Voice of Europe", which did not just spread misinformation, but directly financed EU MEPs in a clear case of corruption as exposed by BIS, the Czech security information service. The BIS revealed a large network led by a famously pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch named Viktor Medvedchuk, who used the network based in Prague to funnel money to EU politicians. Politicians implicated were several high-ranking AfD members, such as Maximillian Krah, as well as others from prominent EU member states. The network primarily targeted far-right EU politicians, such as AfD's Peter Bystron, who the BIS have recorded meeting and taking money from Artem Marchevsky, another central figure in the Voice of Europe operation. The revealed corruption of AfD members led to the collapse of the EU group Identity and Democracy, which was an attempt to unify Europe's conservative parties. In its place came the PfE, filled with the less extreme eurosceptic and right-wing parties, such as Hungary's Fidesz, and the Austrian FPÖ. This allowed the parties to retain their reputation free from the tainted AfD. AfD, together with the more extreme conservative parties, created the ESN, which consistently votes overwhelmingly against resolutions condemning Russia (Becker, 2024). 5.5 USA and transatlantic cooperation During the presidency of Joseph Biden, the United States of America was particularly pro-Ukraine. Lakishyk (2024, pp. 1-10) notes that the Biden administration revitalised US-EU 27 cooperation compared to the last presidency. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, the US and EU swiftly coordinated on military and economic aid for Ukraine, while also swiftly coordinating on economic sanctions against Russia. This crisis also revitalised NATO and discourse about NATO membership in countries such as Sweden and Finland, which led to their accession and prompted NATO members to meet defence spending requirements. The USA, under the Biden administration, also helped the EU to reduce its reliance on Russian energy. The USA significantly increased its LNG (liquid natural gas), a key energy source for many EU countries. By late 2022, the US supplied nearly 50% of the EU's LNG, allowing the EU to cut Russian energy imports drastically (Lakishyk, pp. 3-5). Despite high levels of cooperation between the US and EU during the Ukraine crisis, several factors outside of Ukraine lead to decreased trust and cooperation, such as differing policy, support for Israel/Palestine, the US involvement in Afghanistan, China, trade, technology, etc. (Lakishyk, pp. 4-10). During the presidency of Donald Trump, the pro-Ukraine status quo shifted dramatically. One of the largest switches are from donations to purchases. The USA under Trump no longer provides Ukraine with weapons for free, instead offering to sell arms to the EU for them to give to Ukraine. This forces EU members to use their budgets to purchase American weapons (Spatafora et al., 2025, p.6). Another important effect the US has on European decision making is his wish to end the war by giving the occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia in exchange for peace. This has further forced the EU's hand to send support packages and money to Ukraine (Spatafora et al., 2025, pp. 20-21). This all shows a large shift from being a supporting force to the US's role of main actor on the Ukrainian side, to replacing the US as the main actor due to an increasingly unreliable USA. 5.6 Legal mechanisms In order to be able to manage all of the decisions required by not only the war but other areas of importance, such as economics, political developments, societal concerns, etc, the Council of the European Union relies on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). This 28 committee is composed of ambassadors from all 27 member states, where these ambassadors operate as the intersection of technical drafting and political negotiation. Other functions include being the main preparatory body for the Council, making sure that decisions are largely agreed upon before they reach the ministerial level of the European Union (EUR-Lex, 2021). During the Ukraine war, the Coreper used the “Silent Procedure", found on article 12(1-3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, in order to accelerate certain key decisions. This institutional mechanism allows for a proposal to be automatically adopted if no member state objects in writing by a specific deadline. For example, a legal text that is about a certain sanction would be circulated with a certain deadline. If no objection is received by email at the deadline, then the act is adopted. This mechanism is instrumental in ensuring rapid implementation of important decisions such as sanctions or aid packages without being tied down by bureaucratic and logical difficulties regarding decision-making (EUR-Lex, 2025b). Another legal mechanism that could be used to resolve dissent within the EU is the concept of Constructive Abstention where during a disagreement about the EPF's initial deployment, Neutral states such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta faced domestic, constitutional, and/or political hindrances that prevented them from directly aiding Ukraine militarily (Hoeffler, Hofmann and Mérand, 2024). These countries proceeded to use Constructive Abstention in order to not prevent willing member states from sending lethal military aid to Ukraine (Council of the European Union 2023). Constructive Abstention is a legal mechanism in article 31(1) of the Treaty of the European Union (EUR-lex, 2025a), which allows a member state to abstain from a vote without blocking the decision, only if they accepted that the decision regardless of their input would still make the entire Union commit to the decision. 5.7 Strategic costs Other than political debates, international level decision-making is increasingly informed by assessments regarding long-term economic impact of war done by research bodies and think 29 tanks. A 2025 study made by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Corisk presented a cost analysis for EU member states, comparing the costs of a Ukrainian defence and a Russian victory. The report estimated that a Russian victory would bring forth a cost on Europe between 1.12 trillion and 1.63 trillion euros over a four-year period. Included in these numbers were the costs to manage a new refugee crisis as well as the necessity for a great increase in military defence to secure the eastern border. The study also calculated that the cost of supplying military and financial aid to Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory would be estimated at 522 to 938 billion euros. These projections show a significant economical difference, that the cost of containing Russia and preventing a victory was about half the potential cost of a Russian victory (Bjoertvedt et al., 2025, pp. 11, 23-26). 6. Analysis In this section, the thesis will analyse the fifth research question of how did the EU manage to create unity on policies. It will use the previously mentioned seven core premises of NLI and then further elaborate over certain key institutional mechanisms that answer the question. 6.1. State centrism In the context of the EU response to Ukraine, State centrism fits particularly well because of the emphasis on states being important actors in decision-making and cooperation. That does not necessarily mean that countries are not key in the integration, implementation, and/or cooperation of those decisions that were made. An example of state centrism in practice within the EU regarding unity management is the EPF's initial deployment where neutral countries such as Austria, Ireland, Malta, faced domestic, constitutional and/or political constraints and obstacles which prevented them from funding military aid. In a unanimity-based system, this abstention or veto would normally paralyse the decision of sending EU wide military aid. 30 In order to solve this, the Council invoked article 31(1) of the Treaty of the European Union (EUR-lex, 2025a), called the Constructive Abstention. The use of Constructive Abstention ensured that the EPF could receive lethal aid from willing members, since abstaining members would have their share of the economic contribution re-routed to exclusively finance non-lethal aid such as medical kits, fuel, or ambulances (Council of the European Union, 2023). This intricate institutional balance allows the EU to achieve a political unanimity while accommodating legal sovereignty of its member states. It prevents the lowest common denominator outcome, in this case the EU not sending any lethal aid, and allows a coalition of the willing member states to commit within the EU framework rather than create their own unique and expensive framework from scratch. This is an example of neoliberal institutionalism where the international organisation utilises institutions to lower transaction costs of cooperation while providing flexible mechanisms for a healthy dissension. 6.2. Sovereignty as a resource for international influence Hungary is probably one of, if not the, member states that have been the most defiant and non cooperative EU member. Under Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has acted as a primary internal spoiler, utilising its veto power to block or delay decision to the fullest. However, according to the framework of neoliberal institutionalism, this is not irrational behavior but rather a calculated strategy of hostage-taking within an international setting. Hungary's obstructionism was rarely about the specific foreign policy issue that was at hand. Instead, it was a negotiation strategy (Müller & Slominski, 2025. pp. 11, 19). Hungary was facing the suspension of billions of euros in EU funds due to its consistent breaches of EU Law. An example of this tactic would be how Hungary vetoed an 18 billion euro aid package for Ukraine and the OECD Global Minimum Tax directive in 2022 (Parliament EU, 2022). The goal of this veto was to force the Council to release the frozen Cohesion and Recovery funds. By creating this hostage situation for the EU and Ukraine, Orbán sought to increase the cost of non-payment for other member states involved (Müller & Slominski 2025, pp.3-12). 31 The EU's response is a good demonstration of the strength of the unions' institutional order. It did not splinter or back down, it engaged in complex internal negotiation and preserved the core policy objective whilst managing the dissent. In late 2022, the EU brokered a deal with Orbán where he agreed to lift the veto on the Ukraine 18 billion to Ukraine. In return, the EU approved that Hungary's Recovery and Resilience plan would be approved despite the money otherwise being frozen. This was, however, still tied to certain democratic milestones (Kirkegaard, 2022). The EU did still maintain the suspension of a portion of the Cohesion fund. Following several issues such as the one already mentioned, the EU established the Rule of Law Conditionally Regulation, which was groundbreaking. The rule provided the Union with an easy to use economic sanction against a member state, which changed the bargaining power between dissenting members and the council. Strengthening the Union by giving it a way to punish internal deviance has had mixed results. Orbán has been unable to delay in the same way as in the past without feeling the consequences of it, and aid to Ukraine has subsequently flowed smoother. However, by fully agreeing to what the EU dictates would make him go against his official public position, which might lose him popular support at home. This means that the rule works up to a point since economic sanctions hurt, but losing power hurts more (Koranyi, 2025, 1-28). The whole scenario was a perfect representation of a member state using their sovereignty, in this scenario their right to veto, in order to exert their own influence over the union and come out with a better deal than they would previously have gotten. 6.3. Predominance of political influence over military force The Ukraine war challenges the premise of political influence over military force, yet the EU's response remains consistent with this premise. Even when the EU have been forced to become a military power, they have done so not by blatant army creation, but rather through political and institutional mechanisms. The EPF perfectly demonstrates this, because rather than member states solely acting on their own accord, the provision of lethal aid to Ukraine was instead 32 channeled through a centralised financial mechanism that is regulated by the Council. This, for all intents and purposes, institutionalised the military response of European member states. This turned the delivery of weapons into a process that was governed by a legal framework, reimbursement rules and political consensus (Genini, 2025, pp. 6-13). Additionally, the EU utilised its economical position as a substitute for direct military intervention against Russia, as seen in the 6th sanction package, where the EU leveraged its market power to coerce Russia. By negotiating the ban on seaborne oil all the while managing the exemptions for the Druzhba pipeline-dependent member states such as Hungary (Spike, 2022), the EU prioritised political cohesion over maximising the economic impact against the Russian military. This aligns with the NLI premise that even in security crises, the most effective response is politically negotiated and institutionally bound, rather than determined by raw military capabilities. The EU in its very conception is an international organisation that is heavily reliant on democratic principles of negotiation, fostering the maintenance of peace through diplomacy, so member states reflect this by primarily using diplomacy both internationally and internally, following legalisation which is essentially following precise rules within an institution and adhering to third party adjudication. As the findings chapter have shown, this is particularly valid in the case of the Ukraine war, where both the individual member state and the EU as a whole primarily responded to the crisis economically with sanctions targeting everything between specific national individuals to international state actors, diplomatically supporting Ukraine while denouncing and isolating Russia and their allies, even sending aid packages that can comprise humanitarian aid, military aid, economic aid, financial aid, and more. A great demonstration of this premise of neoliberal institutionalism in action is the 6th sanction package negotiated in early 2022. It mainly proposed a ban on Russian oil imports, and demonstrated how the EU uses economic warfare as their primary weapon against Russia, over direct military force. While the majority of EU members agreed that the Russian military needed 33 to be defunded, the cost to the individual countries differed. While coastal nations such as the Netherlands could easily import oil from overseas, countries such as Hungary do not have that option, instead relying on oil pipelines, specifically, the Druzhba pipeline which brings Russian and Kazakh oil to Hungary and other former communist republics in Eastern Europe. For such countries, a complete ban on Russian oil would be incredibly detrimental to their economy. Due to the unanimity rules of the EU CFSP, Hungary was able to stall negotiations for weeks. The final agreement places a ban on seaborne crude oil and petroleum products but grants a temporary exception for crude oil to be delivered by pipeline. The strategic outcome was that, because an estimated 90% of Russian oil entering the EU arrived by sea, the ban remained highly effective, while the political outcome was that Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic would continue to receive oil via the Druzhba pipeline. Removing the immediate economic threat to their regimes, allowing them to lift their veto on the sanctions. However, there were specific derogations or suspension of the law under a particular circumstance. Bulgaria was granted continued importation of seaborne crude oil until the end of 2024, due to a lack of infrastructure and geographical location, and Croatia was allowed to continue import of Russian vacuum gas oil until the end of 2023, because it was essential for the function of its refinery. This compromise demonstrates how the EU follows the NLI premise that goals are best achieved through economic and diplomatic management over military force (Spike, 2022; European Commission, 2022a). Ultimately, this compromise shows off the neoliberal preference for absolute gain, in this case hurting Russia, even if it means a relatively uneven gain within the EU. Hungary and Slovakia improved their relative economic positions by securing the exemption and are allowed to continue to buy discounted Russian oil while their competitors within the single market paid a premium for crude oil (Levi et al, 2025). However the council introduced anti-circumvention clauses in order to mitigate the free-rider problem posed by future compromises like this one. The clause covers how member states that benefit from the pipeline exemption were prohibited from reselling such crude oil or petroleum products to other member states or third countries. 34 This so-called ring fencing, protected the integrity of the single market and ensured that the side payment remained contained (European Commission, 2022a). One of the exceptional institutional inventions of the EU during the conflict is using the EPF to send military equipment to Ukraine. Doing this was working around the EU's own laws and the constitutional neutrality of certain members. Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union prohibits the Union itself from paying for military equipment. In order to work around this they utilised the EPF, which officially is classified as an off-budget fund financed by the member states instead of the official EU budget. This was originally meant to fund training missions in Africa, but was turned into what is today essentially a war budget over a billion euros (Maletta and Héau, 2022). 6.4. State and nonstate actors organised around institutional principles and entities On several occasions, this thesis has already demonstrated how both state and non-state actors organised in and around institutional principles. On the state level, member states coordinate and organise their own national interest through organisations such as the CFSP, Coreper, the EU parliament, REpowerEU, and the EPF in Ukraine. The previously mentioned Voice of Europe scandal demonstrates how non-state actors, such as Viktor Medvedchuk, attempted to manipulate policy through the EU parliament's financial and organisational structures. When discovered, the guilty parties did not simply disappear, rather reorganising within the institution. The parties with guilty members, chiefly the AfD, shifted from a ID member to creating PfE and ESN. This reorganisation shows that within a neoliberal framework, even parties trying to work against the organisation must do so by existing alongside institutional principles and entities. 6.5. Mutual interest based on international cooperation One of the main weapons of the war in Ukraine, specifically in the early years, has been energy. The war exposed the EU members' dependence on Russian gas, and following supply cuts, each 35 state had a reason to hoard the gas they had. With many members doing this, however, the single market would have crashed and made it expensive for all. In order to avoid such a situation, the EU launched the REPowerEU plan in early 2022 as well as several emergency regulations, which federalised energy policy. The establishment of the EU Energy platform combined individual demand, unified them, and negotiated as one with alternative oil providers, which is very much in line with the fifth premises of Neoliberal institutionalism. By acting like an oil buyers union instead of having each member negotiate separately, the EU prevented EU members from bidding against each other, thus increasing the EU's bargaining power (European Commission, 2022b). Another example of the EU following these premises is its initial choice to stand by Ukraine when the war first began, as well as its continued support despite the economic backlash. Experts and think tanks play an important role in quantifying costs as well as providing the information for decision-making. As previously detailed in section 5.7, studies reveal that the cost of a Russian victory would be nearly double the cost of continuing the current support for Ukraine. From an NLI perspective, this changes the interpretation of EU solidarity. It shows that the decision to support Ukraine was not solely in defence of democracy, but a rationally calculated choice due to mutual interest. By investing in Ukraine's defences, EU members acted to avoid a higher long-term cost stemming from a more threatened Europe combined with a new refugee crisis. This aligns with the NLI premise that cooperation tends to be driven by the desire to minimise possible future risks and secure absolute gains (Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-127, Forte dos Santos, pp. 653-655). Another similar rational cost analysis was with the decision to decouple the wider EU from Russian energy, it was costly but would have been more costly due to the sunk cost fallacy of European integration which dictated the response. The EU's energy markets are physically interconnected with each other through a web of pipelines and cables. Attempting to disentangle this web of complex systems in order to achieve national energy security for a member state was and is technically unfeasible in the short term. Essentially, the mere existence of the EU single 36 market and the interconnected energy grid created a path dependence where it was too big and too complex to reverse (Rabinovych, 2025). This financial incentive acts as a powerful carrot that the EU uses to align national energy policies with the wider EU strategic objective of decoupling from Russia. 6.6. International institutions as mediators of international cooperation The primary mediators within the EU in the context of the Ukraine war are the European Commission and the Coreper. These organisations are the main tools for combining political will with technical necessity (EUR-Lex, 2021). However, the need for mediation implies that the members are not always unified in every issue. At times in need of a rapid response, it can compel the council to implement decisions quickly, which it does through the Silent Procedure mechanism within the Council of the European Union, of which the Coreper is a committee. While use of the Silent Procedure is viewed as an aggressive diplomatic move, it offers a fast-paced decision-making mechanism that can force consensus and remove stalling as a tactic (Thomson Reuters Practical Law, 2025). Another example of the premise of international institutions as mediators of international cooperation is the EU's ability to act as a mediator through flexible mechanisms like the previously mentioned Constructive Abstention. This allowed the EU to mediate the conflict between its security goals and the inherent neutrality of several member states by allowing these member states to abstain from funding military aid, but instead to non-lethal contributions such as medicine, fuel, ambulances, etc (Council of the European Union, 2023), the organisation mediated the situation so that the willing and able countries could proceed with their agreed security arrangements without compromising the neutrality of the legally unable members. 37 6.7. Peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international institutions The EU's use of financial and legal mechanisms in order to defend democratic institutions and in the context of Ukraine, the EU's actions are not just a charitable donation, but a rational calculation to reduce security uncertainty and preserve geopolitical order derived from democratic principles, and international law. This order was put under threat following the invasion of Ukraine. As noted by Keohane (2012, pp. 128-129), institutions exist in order to reduce uncertainty and ensure cooperation. A theoretical Russian victory would bring great instability to the continent, and the decision to mobilise the Ukraine Facility as well as the EPF can be seen as a defense against this. Bjoertvedt et al (2025) in his article Europe's choice Military and economic scenarios for the War in Ukraine, showcases this rationality clearly where they estimated that a Russian victory would cost the EU over 1 trillion euros in defense spending and management of Ukrainian refugees, however if the EU continued support for Ukraine, it would cost significantly less. By investing in Ukraine defense, the EU is guaranteeing the future peace and prosperity of its own member states. The EU successfully aligned the normative goal, which is freedom for Ukraine, with the rational interest of its member states, which is avoiding the high cost of a chaotic geopolitical environment. The EU is composed of twenty-seven member states with different national interests which, especially now during the Ukraine crisis, causes clear internal divides. The issues causing said divide are multifaceted, covering different energy dependencies, different states of economic integration with Russia, and differing threat perception. These divides, on the surface, makes desertion and disunity within the EU seem inevitable. Yet, our findings chapter has shown that despite these divides, the EU managed to mobilise substantial sanctions packages, finance the delivery of military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine, and, despite an economic downturn, initiate a radical decoupling from Russian energy. By observing the EU's actions during the Ukraine war through the lens of Neoliberal Institutionalism in the previous section of this chapter, it becomes clear that EU unity was not the result of a simple alignment of national 38 interests, but of the neoliberal institutional infrastructure which is designed to manage interdependence, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate commitment. 6.8 Summary to Analysis The EU's response to its challenges both external and internal to the Ukraine crisis serves as an example of how NLI works within an international organisation powered by its institutions. Despite having severe internal differences, the union managed to hold itself unified due to its institutional capacity to find compromise and unity. Reasons such as minimised transaction costs due to the commission and Coreper, good management of dissenting members, maximised flexibility, as well as information sharing amongst many other reasons. Other factors such as the sunk cost of leaving the single market, legal order and energy grid create a powerful deterrent against notions of leaving the EU and instead have given the EU leverage for cooperation between member states. 7. Conclusion The objective of this thesis is to analyse how an international organisation arrived at and ensured a consensus in decision-making when under extreme security pressure, utilising the EU during the Ukraine war as a case study. Through the framework of Neoliberal Institutionalism, this study has sought to find the link between the political will for internal unity and the capacity to achieve it by focusing on the micro-level mechanics of crisis management. The research demonstrates that despite internal and external pressures, the EU managed to transition from a soft power actor to a security provider by utilising specific institutional mechanisms. This study posed five research questions which were aimed at understanding the dynamics of EU cohesion. The findings allow for the following conclusions: 39 The trajectory of the development of the EU response happened in the time span of four years, under which it rapidly shifted from emergency aid to employ the “Peace Through Strength" strategy. The main issues that caused disagreements were about the energy sanction and supply of lethal military aid. Weaponisation of interdependence showed that member states that were more reliant on Russian resources, particularly Hungary and Slovakia, consistently opposed full energy bans due to the economic threat that it posed to their stability. For the EU to supply lethal military aid to Ukraine, neutral member states such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta opposed it due to their predisposition of neutrality as well as ideological opposition from the mainstream European political parties from the far-left and far-right due to concerns of war escalation. The study found that while national interests such as trade dependency influenced voting behaviour, the main consistent predictor of voting patterns was political ideology, with certain exception of outliers such as Hungary. The findings demonstrate horseshoe theory where, the far left and far right political groups (e.g., The Left, PfE, ESN) in the European Parliament often voted very similarly against certain resolutions, using “peace” narratives to delegitimize the supplying of military aid, while more moderate and centrist groups (e.g., EPP, S&D, Renew) remained unified in their support for increasing military aid to Ukraine. External influence used the issues the EU faced as a wedge to fracture EU unity. Particularly Russia engaged in mutual legitimation with other illiberal Central European actors such as the FPÖ and Fidesz, utilising hybrid warfare tactics with the Voice of Europe scandal to finance a pro-Russian narrative within the European Parliament. On the other hand, the United States also was influencing the EU's strategic autonomy. While the Biden administration facilitated cooperation with the EU, political shifts and the unreliability which is associated with Donald Trump and his presidency, pushed the EU to seek greater independence from the USA. The EU managed to create unity not by suppressing dissent, but rather by managing it through institutional flexibility by using mechanisms such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention, and the EPF. Additionally, the EU also managed to negotiate with dissenting 40 member states in order to prioritise political cohesion over economic uniformity. For example, with Hungary and the Druzhba pipeline exemption. The application of NLI to this case study illustrates that international institutions are essential for reducing transaction costs and ensuring cooperation. The findings demonstrate the premises of state centrism and sovereignty as a resource. While countries remain the main actors in international politics, the analysis does demonstrate that sovereignty is not a barrier, but at times used as a bargaining chip. This was demonstrated by the hostage taking strategy Hungary utilised, where their veto power was used in order to unlock frozen EU funds. This shows that obstructionism can be a strategy in order to gain national influence in an international organisation such as the EU. The research also demonstrates the NLI premises regarding institutional mediation and the predominance of political influence over military force. Despite at times being compelled to act as a security provider, members and non-state actors organised themselves around institutional principles rather than resorting to raw military creation. By using institutions as mediators, specifically Coreper and the Commission, the EU was able to institutionalise its military response through the EPF. This in turn demonstrates that even in security crises, desired outcomes are achieved best through political negotiation and legal structures instead of uncoordinated state action. The study also shows how the cooperation was driven by rational calculation of mutual interest, serving the institutional purpose of peace and prosperity. The choice to support Ukraine lined up perfectly with cost benefit analyses, which showed that the long-term cost of a Russian victory far outweighed the short-term cost of sending aid. By unifying the goal of defending democracy with the rational interest of economic preservation, the EU acted consistently with the NLI premise that institutions exist to reduce uncertainty and secure welfare. 41 Overall, the Ukraine war acted as a catalyst for the European Union and its institutional capacity for internal cohesion. This thesis concludes that the EU serves as a good example of institutional resilience. By utilising institutional mechanisms like the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention, the financial benefits of REpowerEU and the wider interconnected systems of the union, the EU successfully transforms diverse national interests into a unified security actor. 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